TY - JOUR ID - 120558 TI - Tax competition: Quality and quantity of provision of public goods JO - Iranian Industrial Economics Studies JA - IIES LA - en SN - 2588-6312 AU - Ould Abdessalam, Ahmed Haidara AD - Lecturer at IÉSEG school of management Y1 - 2017 PY - 2017 VL - 1 IS - 1 SP - 21 EP - 32 KW - Marginal cost of public funds KW - Microeconomics KW - Provision of public goods Quality KW - Samuelson rule KW - Tax competition DO - 10.30466/iies.2018.51091.1005 N2 - The present study was an attempt to investigate local governments’ reaction to financing the quality of public goods provision. More especially, whether the local governments must tax the mobile capital or not was addressed. To this end, = Samuelson’s rule and the conditions under which the optimal allocation of resources for private and public goods were examined. The findings demonstrated that if local governments finance the public goods by taxing the households without varying their tax rate on capital, the optimality as defined by Samuelson’s rule, is constrained by the funding of the quality of public goods. However, taxing the capital modifies the Samuelson’s rule. Thus, there is a supplementary cost supported by the households linked to a distorting tax. UR - https://iies.urmia.ac.ir/article_120558.html L1 - https://iies.urmia.ac.ir/article_120558_78f898ccce82060e8b3833fddd77b19e.pdf ER -